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Literature on Inheritance: A Summary of What
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The routines and progressions that have shaped the inheritance in human societies
received extensive scholarly consideration. Studies in this field have explored and
investigated the impact of legal and traditional rules of property transmission on
the structures of the society and the models of political power. This review is not
aimed as an exhaustive evaluation of the extant literature. Rather, it focuses on
illustrating the diversity of the proposed explanations and draws some conclusions
on what can be learnt.
The routines and progressions that have shaped the inheritance in human
societies received extensive scholarly consideration. Studies in this field have
explored and investigated the impact of legal and traditional rules of prop-
erty transmission on the structures of the society and the models of political
power. In an oversimplified manner the inheritance literature can be charac-
terized as an analysis of the default rules and can be divided scholastically into
two large bodies: 1) theory-based explanations and evaluations of the inheri-
tance routines, and 2) empirical data-based models. This review is not aimed as
an exhaustive evaluation of the extant literature of these two narrative strands.
Rather, it focuses on illustrating the diversity of the proposed explanations and
draws some conclusions on what can be learnt.
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1
Theory-based inheritance arguments are sparse and scattered in the politi-
cal and economic literature. Most references start from analysing the inher-
itance default rules in relation with what was considered a just society. The
summary of these views shows relatively little variation in the highlighted ar-
guments. Broadly, the contributors have proceeded either from an impersonal
perspective or from a more ideological one to justify maintenance or change of
inheritance default rules. Adam Smith, David Ricardo, andAlexis de Tocqueville
proceeded rather analytically and found that inheritance rules are the variables
that have the potential to change or preserve society and political power. Smith
observes in his An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations
that “When land was considered as the means, not of subsistence merely, but
of power and protection, it was thought better that it should descend undi-
vided to one”(Smith 1776, III.ii/4). Ricardo analyses the tax system and gives
economic arguments against the state intervention in inheritance rules since
taxing wealth transfer from one generation to the next “will inevitably fall on
capital; since by doing so, they impair the funds for the maintenance of labour,
and thereby diminish the future production of the country” (Ricardo 1817, 190).
Tocqueville when scrutinizing the American society compares rather detached
the consequences of the laws of inheritance: “When framed in a particular man-
ner, this law unites, draws together, and vests property and power in a few
hands: its tendency is clear aristocratic. On opposite principles, its action is
still more rapid; it divides, distributes, and disperses both property and power”
(Tocqueville 1838, 30).
Jeremy Bentham, John Stuart Mill, and Karl Marx proceeded more ideologi-
cally and stated that inheritance rules are the variables than need to be changed
in order for have a better society. Legitimacy of intergenerational wealth trans-
fers, economic growth and social stability are the arguments brought about by
these authors. For example, Bentham argues against absolute rights to property
based on ‘natural law’ and proposes a more utilitarian approach to inheritance:
“Whatever power an individual is, according to the received notions of pro-
priety, understood to possess in this behalf, with respect to the disposal of his
fortune in the way of bequest—in other words, whatever degree of power he
may exercise, without being thought to have dealt hardly by those on whom
what he disposes of would otherwise have devolved—that same degree of power
the law may, for the benefit of the public, exercise once for all, without being
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conceived to have dealt hardly by anybody, without being conceived to have
hurt anybody, and, consequently, without scruple: and even though the money
so raised would not otherwise have been to be raised in the way of taxes” (Ben-
tham, 1795, 12-13). In the first chapter of Principle of Political Economy, John Stu-
art Mill considers that “What rights, and under what conditions, a person shall
be allowed to exercise over any portion of this common inheritance, cannot be
left undecided. No function of government is less optional than the regulation of
these things, or more completely involved in the idea of civilized society”(Mill
1848, 797). For Karl Marx (1848) one of the ten planks in the coming classless
society is the abolition of all rights of inheritance.
2
Empirical data-based inheritance literature tends to be less normative and
more focused on data and model building. This scholarship can loosely fit
into two strands of narratives. On the one hand there are endogenous explana-
tions, where the different inheritance routines are considered as optimal prop-
erty transfer policies aimed to maximize the probability of family, dynasty, or
social class survival, or as strategies that ended up in producing the nuclear
family, or to play down rent seeking among descendants, or as mechanisms to
preserve/distribute wealth in the family, or as patterns that perpetuate poverty
at individual level, or as sources of legal systems. On the other hand there are
the exogenous explanations, where the property transfer practices are consid-
ered as mechanisms established to enforce or generate equality in the society, to
generate societal change, or as causes for being enfranchised or losing the right
to vote in the census vote era. Both strands have theoretical andmethodological
dimensions. Both strands have accounts that focus on macro- and micro- so-
cial and political phenomena. Contributions to both strands come from various
sub-fields of social science. As a caveat, let it be remarked that the endogenous-
exogenous typology is an academic model used here with the sole purpose of
emphasizing particular differences between the logic proposed, in most cases
not explicitly, by the various pieces of literature that are scrutinized.
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Allegedly, at the foundation of the endogenous explanations are those an-
thropologistswho—in the late 19ᵗʰ and the first half of the 20ᵗʰ century—undertook
to account for the early social and political structures or to theorize kinship
designs in different societies (Bell 1932; Calhoun 1932; Drucker 1939; Elton
1886; Fei 1939; Geary 1930; Kinnosuké 1912; Lotka 1929; MacLeod 1923; Mair
1931; Mateer 1883; Murray 1915; Parsons 1943; Pettengill 1913; Torday 1931;
Wright 1903). These studies expound models where primogeniture or partible
routines are linked to the family structure. Some models hypothesize primo-
geniture as optimal succession policies to maximize the probability of lineage
survival and preserve wealth (Drucker 1939; Mair 1931; Murray 1915; Wright
1903), in other models the absence of strict primogeniture was essential to lin-
eage survival (Schultz and Richmond 1911), while others postulate property
partition as an instrument to encourage the break of extended family rela-
tions and to encourage the nuclear version (Parsons 1943). Ethnography and
social-history scholarship following in this path nuanced the models and pro-
vided more data and case studies (Ammar 1954; Bowles; Smith and Mulder
2010; Bunzel 1952; Eglar 1960; Goody, Thirsk andThompson 1976; Hechter and
Bruste 1980; Kennedy 1953; Lockridge 1968; Kivelson 1994; Lancaster 1958; Ja-
cobson 2002; Mayer 1960; Mencher and Goldberg 1967; Mendels 1976; Miller
1952; Mulder, George-Cramer, Eshleman and Ortolani 2001; Muller 1985; Oren-
stein 1965; Plakans 1975; Roden and Baker 1966; Rosenfeld 1968; Sanders 1949;
Sørensen 1996; Stirling 1965). New postulations andmodels were added. A num-
ber showed that inheritance rules, especially partible routines, influences rent
seeking strategies among descendants (Campbell 2005; Lehfeldt 2000; Faith,
Goff and Tollison 2008), while another stream pinpointed the connection be-
tween both primogeniture and partible property transfers, wealth preservation
and family cycles (Berkner 1972; Childs 2001; Crisologo‐Mendoza and Van de
Gaer 2001; Ditz 1990; Dooling 2005; Owens 2001). Primogeniture rules prompted
highly volatile and competitive contests with respect to the excess of male cadet
siblings, who were more likely to embrace military careers and be sent to fight
in the colonies, whereas the oldest son would take his role in the metropolitan
society and avoid military service (Boone 1986).
A corpus of legal studies on inheritance rules and rights has developed analysing
how passing from primogeniture to partible routines influenced the set-up and
the evolution of legal systems, with a special accent on the ideological rejec-
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tion of the primogeniture by the early settlers and the influence of the partible
customs on the law system of the American colonies (Atkinson 1943; Bordwell
1927; Haskins 1957, 1962; Katz 1977; Lund 2009; Priest 2006). This was paral-
leled by scholarship showing how long-established practices, especially male
primogeniture, in some countries in Africa and Asia, resulted in legal unequal
rights between males and female descendants to own and transfer properties
(Kameri-Mbote 2002; Rautenbach 2008; Tebbe 2008).
3
Inheritance-rules-centred economics research tries to explain intergener-
ational wealth allocations and poverty persistence (Davies 1982; Menchik
1979; Mendell 1984; Pryor 1973; Stamp 1926). The main strand in this literature
argues for primogeniture as the main mechanism that ensured the preservation
of big estates and fortunes and wealth inequities, while partition is seen as the
formula that, in an optimistic view, bred and enforced wealth equality and, in a
pessimistic view, produced and maintained poverty (Alston and Schapiro 1984;
Baker 1964; Blinder 1973; Bohac 1985; Davies 1982; Gagan 1976; Hechter and
Bruste 1980; Homans 1937; Huston 1993; Menchik 1980; Perkins 1969; Pryor
1973; Wedgwood 1928). A second important thread in this body of research
make causal claims between inheritance rules and migration with both primo-
geniture and partible routines encouraging migration of siblings either because
some have no inheritance to assure their economic survival or because they did
not have enough to survive in the existing context (Dike 1982; Homans 1937;
Howell 1975; Kasdan 1965; Sánchez-Alonso 2000; Wegge 1998). A third strand
emphasized religious reforms in Europe as path depend on the partible inheri-
tance rules that distorted themonopoly of the Catholic Church and princes over
resources and created societal instability prone to changes orientate against
them (Ekelund, Hébert and Tollison 2002; Fichtner 1989; Hopcroft 1994, 1997). A
fourth line in this literature postulates partible customs as tools that prompted
the capitalist development. As such, partible inheritance created small holdings
that could be easily traded (Bryant 2006; Emigh 2003) and created unsustain-
able subsistence farms and therefore encouraged peasants to move away from
agricultural economy (Bryant 2006; Hagen 1988; Hopcroft 1994; Houston and
Snell 1984; Kriedte, Medick and Schlumbohm 1982; Thirsk 1961).
4
Connecting both with the legal and economic scholarship is the political sci-
ence and history research that considers inheritance rules in the context of
the polis. This body of literature is split in three concerns: the role of legacy
Literature on Inheritance: A Summary of What Can Be Learnt 6 : 5
rules in preserving the state/government, and identifying inheritance patterns
that could produce political unrest. The first interest conceives primogeniture
as optimal property transfer policies aimed to minimize dynastic collapse, to
maximize state survival and, to enhance cohesive leadership, particularly in
medieval times (Bestor 1996; Geevers 2010; Haskins 1966; Hechter and Brustein
1980, Joffe 1988; Miller 1952) whereas partible rules endangered dynastic reign
andmost often resulted in state divisions or collapse (Geevers 2010; Hechter and
Brustein 1980; Hurewitz 1968; Linehan 2008; Le Patourel 1971; Stewart-Brown
1920; Turner 1995).The second interest posits partible inheritance as a proxy for
social instability that ends up in political unrest and societal change (Chasteen
1991; Fennell 1983; Keirstead 1985; Midlarsky 1982, 1988; Scott 1979; Midlarsky
and Roberts 1985). The third concern posits partible routines as a proxy to de-
mocratization processes in early modern period as division of property encour-
aged equality in the society and disrupted the social monopoly of the aristoc-
racy therefore promoting social mobility (Bertocchi 2006; Vogel 1989). Follow-
ing in this path, some studies show that partible inheritance rules favoured the
maintenance of centralized bureaucratic governments whereas impartible rules
favoured strong and independent aristocracies (Linton 1956; Wittfogel 1957).
5
Adding to the influence of primogeniture and partible inheritance rules in
determining the inheritance after-effects, scholars have developed exoge-
nous explanations where the focus is on accounting for changes in property
transfer rules as result of changes in other elements of the society. This lit-
erature examines how the rules and practices of inheritance have changed in
response to political and religious transformations, increasing or decreasing
population pressures, economic development and opportunities, urbanization,
migration, changing roles of various social categories.
Anthropology scholarship is diverse in exogenous explanations. Some stud-
ies interpret partible inheritance regulations as the mechanism that produced
more individuals with voting rights under the census voting regimes of the
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18ᵗʰ and 19ᵗʰ century (Prufer 1928). In the case of some tribal population in
Cameroon, the process of Islam regeneration with enhanced definitions of indi-
vidual rights is considered to have prompted a change inside the partible rules of
inheritance of the respective populations (Moritz 2003). Mennonites were flexi-
ble in changing from primogeniture to partible and vice-versa as their economic
production model reference point oscillated between household and commu-
nity (Longhofer 1993; Quadagno and Janzen 1987). Industrialization combined
with population growth urged lower classes in Japan to adopt male primogen-
iture (Beardsley, Hall and Ward 1959), whereas the population boom dimin-
ished the preference over partible rules in the countryside Turkey, mainly for
economic reasons and tendency to preserve agricultural land (Stirling 1965).
Historic research in this line shows that the nobility repelled partible rules
and endorsed primogeniture for very different practical reasons: for example
the need to preserve title and patrimony prompted a move towards primo-
geniture (Duby 1953; Livingstone 1997), while productivity pressures on their
feudums pushed landlords to abolish partible rules (Faith 1966; Goody 1983).
The American colonists, arguably for ideological reasons, repudiated the aris-
tocratic primogeniture rule and decided that dividing property among heirs was
the bestmechanism to generate andmaintain equality in the new society (Hask-
ins 1942; Huston 1993; Katz 1977; Orth 1992). In Russia, Peter the Great intro-
duced primogeniture in order to undermine the political and social influence
of the noble families’ networks created and maintained on partible inheritance
(Farrow 1966). In the Indian region of Awadh, colonial policies and political
arrangements with local elites that were implemented in order to secure legit-
imacy for the British colonial rulers led to changes in favour of primogeniture
in the inheritance customs of the taluqdars class (Jassal 1997).
6
The enterprise of tracing the results of the various streams of inheritance
literature is a very difficult one. However, students who are interested in the
history of inheritance should ask the obvious question: what can be learned
from this literature? The answer is multifold. Inheritance literature seems to
have little theoretical coherence. Inheritance has been present in the argument
of major classical social, economic and political theorists but with relative little
importance in the larger context of ideas; Adam Smith, David Ricardo, Alexis
de Tocqueville, Jeremy Bentham, John Stuart Mill, and Karl Marx have allocated
relatively small attention to thematter, as compared, for example to the problem
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property and wealth. The arguments and data related to inheritance rules and
practices have failed up to now to be incorporated into a political or economic
theoretic model. In terms of explanation there are a number of correlations and
causal links that could have worked in at particular time and in specific social
contexts. Yet, there are no generalizable linear or curvilinear models that could
be applied. Even more, similar inheritance practices when applied in different
social contexts not always produce similar outputs. Inheritance patterns do not
seem to be unilaterally determined by social, cultural, or economic factors. In
terms of data on which the explanations are based: although abundant, very
rarely there is new empirical evidence that goes contrary to what previous data
already showed. Statistical analyses are rather scarce and suffer from lack of
comparable and consistent data; almost never historical data can be considered
as representative given the way it was collected at specific times; ecological
fallacies are hard to avoid.
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